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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over these matters 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the State's priority lien constitute an illegal defacto 
recovery against the Medicaid recipient under the anti-lien provisions of 
federal law? 
The trial court decided this issue adversely to Appellants in 
denying Appellees' 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. R. 491. It is 
a question of law and, accordingly, the appellate court gives the trial court's 
ruling no deference and reviews it under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's 
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). This issue 
is preserved for appeal because it was the subject of Appellees' motion to 
dismiss and opposed by the Appellants in a countering memorandum. R. 436, 
459-64. 
2. Where the State's recovery is obtained through the 
efforts of the Medicaid recipient's counsel in a third party tort action, 
must the State pay its share of the attorney fees as mandated by this Court 
in State of Utah v. McCoy, 999 R2d 572 (Utah 2000)? 
This is a question of law and the appropriate standard of review 
is "correctness," without deference to the trial court ruling. St. Benedict's Dev. 
Co., 811 P.2d at 196. This issue was a basis for the State's motion for 
-1 -
summary judgment, opposed by the Plaintiffs, and ruled on by the court. R. 
556, 647-53, 703-05. It is, therefore, preserved for appeal. 
Appellants, herewith, relinquish all other issues previously 
submitted for review. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following Utah Code provisions are determinative: 
Section 26-19-4.5(l)(a) (State's claim limited to what is 
actually provided) 
(1) (a) To the extent that medical assistance is actually provided 
to a recipient, all benefits for medical services or payments from 
a third party otherwise payable to or on behalf of a recipient are 
assigned by operation of law to the department if the department 
provides, or becomes obligated to provide, medical assistance, 
regardless of who made application for the benefits on behalf of 
the recipient. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-4.5(l)(a) (1998). 
Section 26-19-5(l)(a) (State can recover amount paid from 
tortfeasor) 
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to 
provide medical assistance to a recipient because of an injury, 
disease, or disability that a third party is obligated to pay for, the 
department may recover the medical assistance directly from that 
third party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(l)(a) (1998). 
/ / 
/ / 
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Section 26-19-7(4) (State must pay 1/3 attorney fees) 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total 
recovery for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of 
the costs in an action that is commenced with the department's 
written consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1998). 
Section 26-19-6 (Recipient's right to notice and to 
intervene) 
(1) Within 30 days after commencing an action under Section 26-
19-5, the department shall give the recipient, his guardian, 
personal representative, estate, or survivor, whichever is 
appropriate, written notice of the action by personal service or 
certified mail to the last known address of the person receiving 
the notice. Proof of service shall be filed in the action. The 
recipient may intervene in the department's action at any time 
before trial. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall name the court in 
which the action is commenced and advise the recipient of his 
right to intervene in the proceeding, his right to obtain a private 
attorney, and the department's right to recover medical assistance 
directly from the third party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-6 (1998). 
Section 26-19-5(5) (Recipient's own action allowed) 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an 
action by a recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or 
damage not included in the department's action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5(5) (1998). 
/ / 
/ / 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed as a class action in the Third District on 
October 27, 1995. R. 1. Plaintiffs alleged that the State of Utah, acting 
through its Office of Recovery Services, had illegally liened settlement money 
from their claims against third party tortfeasors as reimbursement for Medicaid 
funds expended by the State on their behalf. R. 22-23. 
The trial court certified two classes of plaintiffs on January 26, 
1996. R. 98-101. Class I members are injured Medicaid recipients who had 
third party liability ("TPL") claims, but who did not retain an attorney to 
represent them. R. 100. Class II members are identical to Class I except that 
they had retained attorneys who had assisted them in gaining the recovery. 
R. 100. 
Appellants gave notice of depositions and served a request to 
produce documents, which was met with motions to disqualify counsel and for 
a protective order. R. 102-05,106-08. The trial court issued a protective order 
barring discovery on April 23, 1996, and granted the State's motion to 
disqualify on June 21,1996. R. 109-110,231. The disqualification order was 
appealed to this Court which reversed on July 14, 1998 and remanded to the 
trial court with an order to reinstate Appellants' counsel. Houghton v. 
Department of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 63 (Utah 1998). 
-4-
In renewed proceedings before the trial court, Appellants moved 
for a scheduling conference on November 20,1998. R. 427-29. On November 
27, 1998, this Court issued its opinions in Wallace v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1998), and S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998), which declared that 
the State's lien against TPL proceeds was legal. 
Subsequently, the State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on October 27, 1999. R. 430-31. 
The trial court denied this motion, but in its minute entry indicated that the 
precedent set in Wallace and S.S. had effectively negated all issues in the 
Appellants' Complaint except the State's liability for attorney fees. R. 491. 
Going forward solely on the attorney fee issue, the State moved for summary 
judgment, proffering affidavits from state employees which claimed that the 
class representatives were either not entitled to attorney fees or had already 
been allowed an offset by the State. R. 544-87, 572-78. The Appellants 
opposed this motion with a counter affidavit by Attorney James "Mitch" Vilos 
stating, among other things, that unnamed members of Class II were not 
allowed to offset attorney fees by the State. R. 632-46. The trial court granted 
the State's motion for summary judgment, stating, "I conclude that no issues 
relating to a named plaintiff or class representative remain unresolved," and 
that "the claims of the named plaintiffs have failed on the merits." R. 704-05 
-5-
(emphasis added). This appeal arises from the rulings granting summary 
judgment as to attorney fees and upholding the State's priority lien. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Filed in 1995, Appellants filed this class action on 
October 27, 1995, seeking reimbursement of third party settlements illegally 
liened by the State. R. 1. 
2. Class Members with Third Party Claims, Named 
plaintiffs are representatives of classes which consist of persons, and the 
estates of deceased persons, who had third party liability (TPL) claims, 
received Medicaid "medical assistance" from the Utah State Department of 
Health ("the State"), and who have been compelled to pay or relinquish all or 
portions of their TPL recoveries to the State as reimbursement for medical 
assistance. R. 82. 
3. Classes Were Certified. The parties stipulated to class 
certification (R. 97) and the trial court entered an order certifying the two 
plaintiff classes on January 29, 1996. R. 98-101. 
a. Class I plaintiffs, represented by Paul Houghton, are 
individuals injured by the acts of a third party, who became Medicaid 
recipients, who had a lien placed on their recoveries by the State of Utah 
pursuant to the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-1, e? 
-6-
seq., and who did not have counsel in their negotiations with the State 
regarding its claim of lien. R. 100. 
b. Class II plaintiffs, represented by Damian 
Henderson, Billie Henderson, and Wayne Rubens, are identical in every 
respect to Class I plaintiffs except that they had retained counsel and actually 
filed actions, or made claims through attorneys, against the liable third parties. 
R. 100. 
4. Plaintiffs Did Not Get Discovery, Plaintiffs filed 
discovery requests in 1996, which drew a motion to disqualify counsel and 
motion for protective order. R. 102-08. The trial court granted disqualification 
and issued a protective order forbidding discovery. R. 109-10. After remand, 
the State moved for summary judgment, and no discovery was ever conducted. 
R. 544-87. 
5. Supreme Court Reversed. This Court reversed the 
disqualification order on July 14, 1998. R. 409-18; Houghton, supra. 
6. Motions for Summary Judgment On remand, the State 
moved for summary judgment on May 24, 2000, and for a protective order 
prohibiting discovery on July 11, 2000. R. 507, 608. Both motions preceded 
Plaintiffs' latest attempt to compel discovery which was filed on July 25,2000. 
-7-
R. 688-89. On October 23, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to compel 
discovery and granted the State's motion for summary judgment. R. 703-06. 
7. Large Number of Class Members, The number of 
potential class members in both classes is likely very large, since the State has 
asserted and collected priority liens for years, and often refused to pay attorney 
fees, at least until the Spring of 2000. There are at least two Class D plaintiffs 
in counsel's own office, as attested by Attorney James D. Vilos. There were 
undoubtedly many others between 1993 and 2000, such as Plaintiff Sevey in 
State v. McCoy, 999 P.2d 572 (2000), which case originated in 1993. By 
implication, if the State treated others as it treated Mr. Sevey in McCoy, there 
would be a minimum of seven (7) years of plaintiffs during that interval who 
were assessed illegal priority liens and with whom the State refused to share 
attorney fees. Therefore, there are likely hundreds of class members. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The Priority Is Illegal, 
The priority issue in this litigation is quite different legally and 
factually from the issues previously addressed by this Court in Wallace and 
S.S. This case asks the Court to examine whether the State, in according its 
lien with a special priority, violates the federal anti-lien law because the effect 
-8-
of the priority is to levy a de facto lien or recovery directly on the recipient. 
Liens or recoveries against recipients of Medicaid benefits are illegal. 
This Court has already settled the basic issue of the legality of the 
State's lien against third party tort settlements by Medicaid recipients. Such 
liens are not illegal under federal law because they are deemed to attach on the 
proceeds of the settlement in the hands of a third party. See Wallace and S. S., 
supra. When originally filed, this class action sought to invalidate the State's 
liens on the same basis as the plaintiff sought in Wallace. However, when 
Wallace was handed down during the pendency of this action those claims 
were abandoned. Plaintiffs do not seek herein to relitigate or revisit those 
issues, and they are accepted as binding in this litigation. 
The State's priority has the effect of an illegal lien because it pays 
100% and pays first, thus taking a disproportionate share of the recovery, often 
wiping out the recipient portion entirely. This is especially true with modest 
settlements which are inadequate to pay all damages. 
An analysis of the applicable statutes confirms the illegality of the 
State's priority scheme. When a person is injured by the negligence of a third 
party tortfeasor and rendered indigent, that person qualifies for "medical 
assistance" under the Medicaid program. However, the injured person is 
required to assign to the State a claim for the amount of the medical assistance 
actually paid by the State. That claim is protected by law and is left to the 
-9-
State to pursue. The injured recipient cannot bring that claim as part of his/her 
own tort action without the State's written consent. However, other statutes 
acknowledge and protect the injured recipient's right to bring an independent 
third party tort claim against a tortfeasor ("TPL claim"), as long as that claim 
does not also include the State's right of action for the medical assistance 
actually paid. With this exception, the Medicaid recipient's own tort claim is 
unrestrained. 
Although this Court has addressed the basic legality of the lien, 
it has never addressed the effect of the priority. Since the priority often 
devastates an indigent, severely injured recipient, its legality needs to be 
carefully examined by this Court. 
B. Attorney Fees Are Owed, 
Regardless of how the Court rules on the priority issues raised in 
this appeal, the State still owes substantial money to recipients for the State's 
share of attorney fees under this Court's ruling in McCoy. In the Spring of 
2000, this Court held unequivocally that the State owed an injured Medicaid 
recipient a one-third share of attorney fees for lien amounts recovered through 
the recipient's attorney. These attorney fees are owed even though the State 
Jid not consent to the representation of its lien interest, and even though the 
recipient did not fully cooperate with the State. If the State made its lien 
-10-
recovery through the efforts of recipient's attorney, it owes the attorney fee 
contribution. 
The trial court refused to apply McCoy because of its erroneous 
beHef that a class action fails if the claims of the class representatives are moot. 
This argument fails on two grounds. First, long-standing legal precedents in 
class action cases require continuation of the action for certified class 
members, even though the claims of the named class members may be moot or 
invalid. Second, since no discovery was allowed, and all facts and inferences 
are construed in favor of a party opposing summary judgment, it is clear that 
even the named class members have a cause of action upon discovery. 
C. Relief Sought 
The class members (Appellants) ask this Court to thoroughly 
examine the effect and impact of the priority, and rule that it constitutes an 
illegal lien or recovery in violation of federal law. Under existing state 
statutes, which accord protection to the injured recipient's independent claim 
for recovery, it is clear that both the State and the injured recipient have valid, 
cognizable claims. Accordingly, this Court should hold that the State's priority 
claim is illegal, and that the State must apportion its medical assistance claim 
with the injured person's non-medical assistance claims, as is done in many 
other states. This result acknowledges the legality of the State's lien, but limits 
-11-
it to a proportionate amount based upon the non-medical assistance claim of 
the injured recipient. 
The Appellants also ask the Court to reverse the trial court and 
direct it to apply this Court's ruling in State v. McCoy to the claims of all class 
members, named and unnamed. There are a minium of seven to eight years of 
Medicaid recipients who are class members, to whom the State did not pay its 
fair share of attorney fees on third party settlements, pursuant to McCoy. This 
situation may be rectified through this class action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
- The Priority is Illegal -
THE "PRIORITY" STATUS ACCORDED THE STATE'S 
MEDICAID LIEN IS A DE FACTO RECOVERY 
DIRECTLY ON THE RECIPIENT AND THEREFORE 
ILLEGAL UNDER FEDERAL LAW. 
A. Introduction to the Issue. 
The priority status of the State's lien on third party liability 
settlements devastates many severely disabled citizens. Class members do not 
contend herein that the State's lien is per se illegal, but ask the Court to 
consider the practical effect of the priority, as applied, in the cases of hundreds, 
or perhaps thousands, of Utahns. The "priority" allows the State to be paid 
first and exclusively, and thus to devour a disproportionate share, sometimes 
-12-
all, of the settlement proceeds. This seriously impairs or destroys the indigent 
recipient's tort claim. Because the priority has such a devastating impact, this 
Court should closely examine its validity. The problem is resolved if the Court 
requires apportionment of the respective claims. 
B. The Legality of the Priority Not Yet Addressed, 
None of the three recent cases dealing with the State's lien on TPL 
settlements have settled the legality of the State's priority. In Wallace v. 
Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), the majority opinion does not mention the 
State's priority, but it is mentioned in a footnote in Justice Durham's dissenting 
opinion: 
The briefs also raised the important issue of whether the State has 
apriority lien against the third party and thus recovers 100% of 
its expenses before anyone else collects anything, or whether it 
can recover an amount proportional to the expenses of the other 
claimants. We obviously do not reach this issue in this case. 
Id. at 452, n. 5 (emphasis added). The State argued below that Justice 
Durham's footnote was mistaken, contending that Wallace did validate the 
State's priority. R. 533. Specifically, the State pointed to a sentence near the 
end of the opinion which stated, "Therefore, we hold that the state has a valid 
assignment and an enforceable right against third party recoveries for S.S.'s 
injury up to the amount of Medicaid assistance paid as of the time of the 
settlement proceeds." R. 534, quoting S.S., 972 P.2d at 442 (emphasis added). 
-13-
However, this language contradicts the State's assertion. The phrase "up to the 
amount o f obviously means less than the full amount is a possibility. It 
certainly does not validate a State priority. 
In S.S., this Court addressed whether the State can recover 
Medicaid reimbursement for assistance paid on behalf of a minor recipient, 
before the proceeds are placed in a special needs trust. The trust would have 
completely wiped out the State lien! This obviously was not at all fair to the 
State. The S.S. opinion did not consider the issue of the State's priority, but 
the State still argued below that S.S. and Wallace upheld a "statutory scheme" 
which embraced the priority. R. 534. This argument is misplaced because 
neither opinion mentions the priority, but only allow for the possibility of 
reimbursement "up to" the full amount of medical assistance paid. 
The State also argues that language in McCoy settled the priority 
issue. R. 535, quoting 999 P.2d at 575. But McCoy only upheld., again, the 
basic validity of the lien under federal law. It did not address the priority issue. 
Id. at 572, 575. 
The essence of Wallace, S.S. and McCoy is that a lien against the 
settlement does not contravene federal law. That is clear. Unresolved, 
however, is whether the priority is really a de facto lien or illegal recovery 
against the recipient, which would violate the federal anti-lien law. In so 
-14-
many cases, the priority clearly and substantially impairs or entirely eliminates 
a recipient's claim. 
C. State Lien Limited to What It Actually Paid, 
Section 26-19-4.5(l)(a) limits the amount of the department's 
assigned right "to the extent that medical assistance is actually provided io a 
recipient." (Emphasis added.) This "actually provided" limit is reiterated 
elsewhere in the Act. For example, § 26-19-5(l)(a) limits the department's 
recovery right against a third party to "the medical assistance" paid.1 Federal 
law also prohibits a state from seeking recovery for more than the "medical 
assistance" paid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(A)(l)(a) (2001); see also, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p (2001). This limitation on the State's right is important because it 
means that without "priority," the State must stand on equal footing with all 
other claimants to a TPL settlement. This implies apportionment. 
D. An Injured Recipient Has an Independent Claim. 
TWO independent, separate claims are contemplated by the 
statutes, one by the State and the other by the recipient. An injured recipient's 
right to bring an independent claim to settlement proceeds is confirmed by 
The flip side of the State's right of recovery is a protection for the recipient 
as well. Since the department may not seek recovery against the third party for any 
more than the "assistance" actually paid, the recipient's claim for non-medical 
assistance damages (i.e pain and suffering, wage loss, future medical etc.) is preserved 
and unimpaired. 
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statutes and case law. Section 26-19-5(5) gives the department a right to 
commence its own independent action against a third party, but "does not bar 
an action by a recipient . . . for loss or damage not included in the 
department's action." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the recipient has 
his/her own claim and may file it, without restriction, as long as it does not 
include a claim for the assistance paid by the department. 
Section 26-19-7( 1 )(a) reaffirms the existence of two claims when 
it says that the recipient may not file or settle a claim against the third party 
"for recovery ofmedical costs for an injury. • .for which the department has 
provided. . . medical assistance." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the 
injured person is free to claim for the non-medical assistance damages. 
Furthermore, even though the department has a right to bring an independent 
action against the third party under § 26-19-6, the recipient has an absolute 
right to "intervene in the department's action at any time before trial." Id. The 
department must also give the recipient notice of: the right to intervene in the 
proceeding, the recipient's right to obtain a private attorney, and "the 
department's right to recover medical assistance directly from the third party." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In sum, both Medicaid ("the department") and the injured person 
have separate claims against the same proceeds in the hands of the third party. 
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They can prosecute them separately, or together by intervening in each other's 
actions. It is clear that the recipient has no right to sue or recover the State's 
medical assistance claim, but it is equally clear that the State has no right to 
any portion of the recipient's claim (as long as the recipient does not include 
the amount paid by the State for medical assistance). The provisions of § 26-
19-6 (i.e., rights to notice and to intervene) confirm a State duty to protect, or 
at least not impair, the recipient's action. 
The State's priority clearly results in recovery against the property 
of the recipient by taking his/her money or right to receive settlement money. 
Money is property, as is the right to receive money. A "chose in action" is 
defined as a "right of proceeding in a court of law to procure payment of sum 
of money, or right to recover . . . a sum of money by action. . . . A right to 
receive or recover... damages on a cause of action . . . for tort or omission of 
a duty." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 219 (West Publishing Co. 1979). 
A Utah statute defines "personal property" in pertinent part as follows: 
(p) "Personal Property" includes every description of 
money, goods, chattels, effects, evidences of rights in actions, 
. . . by which any pecuniary obligation... is created. . . . and 
every right or interest therein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(l)(p) (1994) (emphasis added). The Utah Private 
Property Protection Act of 1994 defines private property as including "any.. . 
personal property in this state that is protected by either the Fifth or Fourteenth 
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Amendment of the United States or Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-90-2(1) and (3) (1997). The recipient's interest in the 
tort settlement is clearly property. 
This Court has long recognized a victim's claim against the 
proceeds of a TPL settlement at the moment an agreement is reached with the 
tortfeasor. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1985). Justice Durham there wrote for the majority that at the moment an 
agreement is reached on a TPL settlement, an accord arises between the parties, 
"one to give or perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment or 
performance in satisfaction of a claim." Id. at 692. An elderly woman had 
been hit by a car driven by defendant's insured. The parties reached an oral 
agreement on a settlement of the claim to be subsequently formalized in 
writing. However, the victim died due to complications from her injuries 
before the parties had executed the written settlement agreement. Justice 
Durham noted, "In our view, the agreement reached by the parties on March 
24, five days prior to Mrs. Blackhust's death, was a completed contract and as 
such is valid and enforceable." Id. at 692. Likewise, Medicaid recipients 
holding TPL claims have an immediate claim to the proceeds of the case as 
soon as an agreement is reached. 
As applied to the instant case, each member of Classes I and II 
procured settlements with a third party tortfeasor. In each of those cases, at the 
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moment that an agreement was reached, a binding, enforceable legal 
relationship was formed whereby the liable party agreed to pay a certain 
amount in settlement of the TPL claim against it. Each class member holds a 
valuable claim for lost wages, future medical care, lost earning capacity, pain 
and suffering and other damages. Even though each of these recipients 
assigned to the State his/her claim for medical assistance "actually provided," 
there is undeniably no assignment for other damages arising from the 
occurrence. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-19-5(5), 26-19-7(l)(a). The State's 
lien claim on the proceeds is created at the very same moment as the recipient's 
"completed contract" claim. Under Blackhurst, both become "valid and 
enforceable" at the moment "the agreement [is] reached." Blackhurst, 699 P.2d 
at 692. Thus, at the moment of settlement, there exist two valid, competing 
claims to the settlement proceeds. 
The Utah statutes, combined with this Court's ruling in 
Blackhurst, unquestionably confirm the recipient's right to maintain an 
individual claim to the TPL settlement for all other damages. However, if the 
statutes are construed as the State would have it, the provisions obviously 
become inconsistent and nonsensical. Under the State's interpretation, for 
example, it is impossible for the State to take its priority recovery and still 
preserve the recipient's independent claim because the State takes at least a 
disproportionate share, and often takes everything. When construing statutes 
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that are ambiguous or in apparent conflict, the court has an obligation "to 
render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Min. 
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Interpreting these statutes as 
confirming two independent claims, one by the State and the other by the 
recipient, is the only reasonable way to construe them. Otherwise, an 
unnecessary conflict is created. 
This Court concluded in S. S. v. State: 
that the insurance benefits were effectively assigned and that 
repayment of previous Medicaid expenditures takes priority over 
the use of the insurance benefits to establish a supplemental 
needs trust. 
Id. at 444 (emphasis added). Does this language contradict the analysis above, 
in that it appears to uphold the priority? The answer is no. The facts of S.S. 
indicate that the priority of the repayment was apparently never challenged. 
Plaintiff there attempted to put the entire settlement into a special needs trust 
and completely avoid payment of the State's lien. The case merely holds that 
an injured party may not use a trust to avoid payment to the State; so in that 
limited sense, Medicaid does take priority over a trust that sought to totally 
exclude the State. 
The recipient may be only one of several parties who hold a claim 
to the proceeds of the settlement. For instance, it is common practice for an 
injured TPL claimant to give a doctor, hospital or health insurance carrier a 
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lien on proceeds arising from the settlement. This lien typically secures 
compensation for care or services provided, and is enforceable against the 
settlement proceeds. All would agree that the doctor, hospital or carrier could 
enforce the lien once the settlement had been secured. Could the State argue 
that its "priority lien" somehow takes precedence over the doctor's lien? Of 
course not. If the proceeds were insufficient at settlement to pay both the 
doctor's and the State's liens in full, they would have to be apportioned so that 
each would share in the settlement proceeds in proportion to the amount of the 
respective claims. 
Likewise, the recipient retains outstanding claims for damages, 
other than medical assistance, against the settlement proceeds. This individual 
claim remains enforceable and viable, even after the recipient assigns his 
medical assistance claims to the State. To the extent the State uses its priority 
to impair these claims, it has recovered against the property of the recipient, 
which is prohibited by federal law. If the State could not use its priority to take 
from the doctor's claim, why should the recipient's non-medical assistance 
claims be any different? They are not different. 
E. Federal Law Prohibits Liens or Recoveries Against Recipients. 
Liens and recoveries against recipients are prohibited by federal 
law: 
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No lien may be imposed against the property of any individual 
prior to his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be 
paid on his behalf under the State plan.. . (exceptions inapposite 
in this case). 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, 
except. . . (exceptions not relevant to plaintiffs in this case). 
42U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(l)and42U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (2001) (emphasis added). 
State plans must "comply with the provisions of § 1396p . . .with respect to 
liens." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2001). Appellants submit that these 
prohibitions apply directly to the State's application of its priority under § 26-
19-5. Since the recipient may maintain his/her own claim outside the State's 
claim for medical assistance, to the extent that the State exercises its priority 
and disproportionately reduces or wipes out the recipient's recovery in these 
other claims, it has recovered against the recipient's property. Whenever the 
State's priority disproportionately reduces or wipes out the recipient's other 
rightful claims, it is illegal under § 1396p. 
F. How the Priority Impairs Recipients' Claims, 
To illustrate the devastating effect of the priority on the recipient, 
a brief example is in order. Suppose a 39-year-old woman was severely 
injured in an automobile accident where a third person is at fault, rendered 
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permanently and totally disabled, and unable to pay for her medical treatment.2 
The State expends $107,000 in medical assistance to pay for her care. She 
retains an attorney to recover from the third party tortfeasor. Her total claim 
would have a conservative value of $500,000, including damages for pain and 
suffering, future lost wages and future medical expenses, as well as the State's 
claim for medical assistance paid. The attorney is successful in negotiating a 
$110,000 settlement, the limit of insurance coverage, but the State levies it 
priority lien for its entire amount of $107,000 or 97.3% of the settlement. 
After the State takes its priority, the victim is left with only about 2.7% of the 
recovery, or $3,000 which is only .006 of her damages (a little more than lA of 
1%). 
On the other hand, if the priority was not in place, the settlement 
would be apportioned among all parties according to their respective claims. 
The breakdown would look something like this: the State would be entitled to 
$107,000/$500,000 = 21.4% x $110,000 = $23,540; and the victim would 
be entitled to $393,000/$500,000 = 78.6% x $110,000 = $86,460. The 
practical effect of the State's priority in the hypothetical is to unfairly and 
2
 The facts of this example are an actual case currently pending before the 
Sixth District in Manti, in State v. Streight, Civil No. 990600417 (the Honorable Kay 
L. Mclff). The facts in the example are the actual facts in the case. The court has 
awarded summary judgment in favor of the State based upon Wallace, but an order 
has not yet been entered and is pending. 
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illegally take the victim's rightful share of the settlement proceeds. The 
priority in this example costs the victim about $83,000 ($86,460 - $3,000) of 
the recovery, dollars meant to provide for her needs and future care. This 
$83,000 priority is an illegal de facto lien or recovery on the property of the 
victim recipient which violates the anti-lien provisions of § 1396p. 
G. Apportionment is Implied at Law and Fair. 
This Court may reasonably construe the existing statutes and cases 
as requiring apportionment where the settlement is insufficient to pay all 
claims fully. Apportionment resolves any ambiguities or conflicts in the 
statutes and dicta of previous cases, and is sound public policy. The most 
reasonable interpretation of this body of law is that the State has a valid lien 
against settlement proceeds in the full amount it has paid, but so does the 
recipient have a valid claim for the full amount of his/her damages (after 
deducting the State's claim). Where the amount of the settlement or judgment 
is sufficient to pay both claims in full, there is no argument. However, where 
the settlement does not pay everyone in full, it will be apportioned among the 
claiming parties, including the recipient. Apportionment of competing claims 
is the rule under ordinary common law and satisfies the dual requirements that 
the State pursue reimbursement from third party tortfeasors while refraining 
from recovering against the recipient. 
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Other states have recognized the need to apportion TPL 
settlements. A Missouri statute provides: 
The court may reduce and apportion the departmentrs lien 
proportionate to the recovery of the claimant. The court may 
consider the nature and extent of the injury, economic and 
noneconomic loss, settlement offers, comparative negligence as 
it applies to the case at hand, hospital costs, physician costs, and 
all other appropriate costs. 
Missouri Rev. Stat. § 208.215(11) (2001) (emphasis added). This statutory 
scheme allows the trial court to take into account multiple factors in 
apportioning the recovery. However, the same result is implied in Utah 
because our statutes clearly establish two competing claims in the same 
settlement. 
Indiana likewise requires the apportioning of settlements that do 
not result in full recovery: 
If a subrogation claim or other lien or claim that arose out 
of the payment of medical expenses or other benefits exists in 
respect to a claim for personal injuries or death and the claimant's 
recovery is diminished: 
(1) by comparative fault; or 
(2) by reason of the uncollectibility of the full value of the 
claim for personal injuries or death resulting from limited liability 
insurance or from any other cause; 
the lien or claim shall be diminished in the same 
proportion as the claimant's recovery is diminished. The party 
holding the lien or claim shall bear a pro rata share of the 
claimant's attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 
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See Indiana Code § 34-51-2-19 (2001) (emphasis added). The Indiana Court 
of Appeals recently interpreted this statute as requiring an apportioned 
reduction of the Medicaid lien: 
[T]he Legislature intended that the [medical agency] have a lien 
to the extent of the Medicaid funds expended by the office, except 
where the claimant's recovery is diminished by comparative fault 
or by the uncollectibility of the full value of the claim resulting 
from limited liability insurance or from any other cause. In such 
instances (where the claimant's recovery is diminished), the lien 
is then diminished by the same proportion that the claimant's 
recovery is diminished. Thus, because Pedraza's recovery was 
diminished by 80%, the Medicaid lien in this case should likewise 
be reduced by 80%. 
Pedraza v. Grande, 712 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ind. App. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
The New Mexico Court of Appeals ordered apportionment of TPL 
proceeds based on equitable principles in White v. Sutherland, 585 P.2d 331 
(N.M. App. 1978). In that case, the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic by the 
careless acts of a chiropractor who tendered his $100,000 policy. The State 
paid $39,000 in medical assistance and asserted a reimbursement lien for the 
first $39,000 of the settlement proceeds, claiming it was "subrogated to any 
rights of the recipient against a third party for recovery of medical expenses." 
Id. at 334. Relying on the earlier anti-lien predecessor to § 1396p, the New 
Mexico court refused to enforce the lien, opting instead for an equitable 
division of the settlement money based roughly on proportions. Id. 
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Other states have followed Missouri, Indiana, and New Mexico 
in ordering apportionment of TPL settlements. Alabama apportions between 
Medicaid and recipients, according to the value of the respective claims: 
42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(25)(C) does not specifically require or even 
suggest 100% recovery [by the state]. Rather, equitable 
principles should be applied to determine Medicaid's right of 
recovery and such would depend on the facts of each case. 
Smith v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 461 So.2d 817, 820 (Ala. App. 1984). 
Florida has likewise ordered apportionment: 
[The state] is entitled to a lien against and to seek reimbursement 
from amounts received by a medical assistance recipient from 
third parties. However, that amount to which [the state] is 
entitled should be determined in each case on a pro rata or 
proportionate basis according to what percentage of the total 
damages sustained is recovered by the medical assistance 
recipient and what percentage of those damages should equitably 
be characterized as a recovery for past medical services or 
expenses. 
Underwood v. Dept. of Health Rehab. Serv., 551 So.2d 522, 526 (Fla. App. 
1989) (emphasis added). Tennessee has similarly found that the state is not 
required to recover in full, but that the trial court should be able to apportion 
the TPL settlement, because federal statutes: 
simply mandate that a state seek reimbursement from a legally 
liable third party; the provisions do not require that a state acquire 
a full subrogation recovery, nor do they supplant a state's law 
with regard to the applicability of the made whole requirement as 
it relates to subrogation. 
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Blankenship v. Estate of Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Term. 1999). 
Apportionment of claims is commonly applied legally and 
equitably in Utah. For example, in Esquivel v. Labor Com 'n of Utah, 7 P.3d 
777, 2000 UT 66 (Utah 2000), the heirs of a deceased worker successfully 
brought to judgment a third party wrongful death suit. However, the industrial 
carrier refused to pay its proportional share of the attorneys fees, claiming a 
100% offset against the worker's net recovery. The Court held that although 
"a third-party recovery must reimburse the employer or insurer for workers' 
compensation sums already paid as well as offsets for future liability of sums 
owed," as required by the applicable statutes, that didn't end the issue. Id. at 
781-2. "[T]he employer or insurer must first bear a proportionate share of the 
expenses for obtaining the recovery," which included attorney fees and out-of-
pocket costs. Id. at 782 (emphasis in original). The court's interpretation of 
this statute "ensures this equitable arrangement." Id. By analogy, legal and 
equitable principles in this case compel apportionment among the parties, both 
of whom have valid legal claims to settlement proceeds. 
Apportioningthe proceeds from the TPL settlement is the only fair 
thing to do. After all, the recipient by definition is a person in financial straits 
who has petitioned the State for medical assistance. Many of the plaintiff class 
members have been severely and permanently injured in their accidents and 
require long term, specialized care. The proceeds from their TPL claims are 
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meant to provide for these expenses and give the recipients some financial 
security. Apportionment is a great leveling factor because no matter how small 
or big the settlement, the State and the injured recipient still get a just 
proportion of recovery. There is equality here. 
The Court should note that the purpose of the Medicaid program 
is to provide assistance to those who need medical care, not to provide short 
term State loans to recipients for medical expenses. The recipients have valid 
claims for real damages; they should get proportional footing with the State in 
seeking the settlement proceeds. 
H. Unnamed Class Members Have a Cause of Action. 
One basis of the trial court's ruling was that the claims of the 
named class members were moot, requiring dismissal of the claims of the entire 
class. This ruling not only ignores the factual issues that existed as to the 
named class members, but also constitutes a significant legal error. The claims 
of unnamed certified class members always survive, even though the named 
class representative is determined not to have a claim. This is argued below 
in Point II.B. and is incorporated herein by reference. 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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POINT II 
- Class Members Entitled to Attorneys Fees -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IGNORING THIS 
COURT'S HOLDING INSTATE V. McCOYAND BARRING 
THE UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS FROM 
COLLECTING ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. Procedural Background of the Issue. 
A short explanation of the evolution of the attorney fee issue is in 
order. When plaintiffs filed this action in 1995, they sought recompense for 
all TPL settlement proceeds liened by the State. R. 34-35. The trial court 
certified the two plaintiff classes on January 9,1996. R. 98-101. Thereafter, 
a disqualification of counsel order was issued, which this Court unanimously 
reversed on July 14,1998. R. 231,409-18. On remand, Appellants were in the 
process of compelling discovery when this Court issued its opinions in Wallace 
and S.S. which established the legality of the State's liens on TPL recoveries. 
Later, on February 3, 2000, the trial court denied a motion by the State for 
judgment on the pleadings but noted that: 
[OJnly one issue can be reasonably extracted from the complaint 
which survives the reach of the holdings in Wallace and S.S.: 
whether a plaintiff is entitled to offset against the State's claim for 
Medicaid reimbursement, attorney's fees, costs and other 
expenses. 
R. 491 (emphasis added). This ruling by the trial court effectively winnowed 
all of the Appellants' claims down to the issue of attorney fees. R. 495. 
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This Court issued its opinion in McCoy on April 14,2000, holding 
that the State must allow a recipient to offset for attorney fees when the State 
recovers against the TPL settlement, even when the State does not grant 
permission for representation of its claim. On May 24, 2000, the State in the 
case sub judice moved for summary judgment, proffering self-serving 
aftidavits from ORS employees claiming mootness, i.e., that the named 
plaintiffs in Class II had already been allowed to offset for attorney fees. 
R. 575-78. No discovery had yet been undertaken! The trial court granted the 
State's motion for summary judgment ruling that: 
In light of the holding in McCoy, I conclude that no issues 
pertaining to a named plaintiff or class representative remain 
unresolved and that the plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed. 
I agree in principle with plaintiffs' statements of law relating to 
the viability of class actions after the claims of a named plaintiff 
become moot. The state of affairs here, however, is not mootness. 
Rather, the claims of the named plaintiffs have failed on the 
merits. 
R. 704-05 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court looked only at the "named 
plaintiffs" while ignoring the rest of the certified class. This is manifestly 
contrary to established class action law. Moreover, depriving the named class 
representatives of discovery unfairly hindered acquisition of information 
necessary to defeat the motion for summary judgment. 
/ / 
/ / 
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B. Claims of a Certified Class Continue Even if the Claim of the 
Named Representative Becomes Moot, 
The court's finding was reversible error because it abrogated the 
claims of hundreds of unnamed class members without a hearing. Unnamed 
members of a certified class have a cause of action even if the claims of the 
named class representatives are invalid or moot. Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that 
unnamed class members of a certified class could prosecute their suit even 
though the named plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the outcome of the 
case, so long as the unnamed members continued to have valid claims. The 
plaintiff truck drivers there filed a class action against their company, claiming 
that it had systematically discriminated in hiring and promotions on the basis 
of race. Id. at 750-751. The district court certified Petitioner Lee as the sole 
named representative, for all black applicants. Id. at 751. After trial, the 
district court found that the company was liable and issued an injunction 
prohibiting continuation of the discriminatory practices but refused to award 
back pay or seniority status to those negatively affected. Id. The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated the district court's decision and awarded the back 
pay and seniority to all plaintiffs except the one class of plaintiffs represented 
by Petitioner Lee. Id. at 751-52. The court sided with the district court in 
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finding that because Lee had been discharged for cause, his claims for seniority 
were moot and the claims of the class he represented had to be dismissed. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that even 
though Lee had no claim to seniority relief because he had been terminated for 
cause, the unnamed class members could obtain the seniority relief because 
they had maintained: 
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the 
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends 
for illumination of difficult... questions. 
Id., quoting£<3fe>r v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962) (emphasis added). Rather 
than mechanically dismissing the class's claim once the named representative's 
claim became moot, the court ruled that a more holistic inquiry was in order: 
Given a properly certified class action, [previous precedent] 
contemplates that mootness turns on whether, in the specific 
circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court, 
an adversary relationship sufficient to fulfill this function 
exists. In this case, that adversary relationship obviously 
obtained as to unnamed class members with respect to the 
underlying cause of action and also continues to obtain as 
respects their assertion that the relief they have received in 
entitlement to consideration for hiring and backpay is inadequate 
without further award of entitlement to seniority benefits. This 
becomes crystal clear upon examination of the circumstances and 
the record of this case. 
Id. at 755-56 (emphasis and bracketed words added). The claims of the 
unnamed class members were not moot because they retained a "case or 
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controversy" which could be maintained within the traditional notions of 
justiciability. Id. at 754-56. To determine whether a party has a justiciable 
case, a court should consider whether the case was presented in an adversary 
context, whether the dispute was capable of resolution through the judicial 
process, and whether the proposed resolution would violate separation of 
powers principles. Id. at 754, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 
(1968). 
Even though the named plaintiff had been discharged for cause 
and was ineligible for the seniority relief granted, the unnamed members of the 
class retained valid claims for relief and would be directly benefitted by the 
grant of seniority. Franks, 424 U.S. at 756-57. They had justiciable claims. 
The Court expressly rejected the knee-jerk, reactionary approach used by the 
trial court in this case where an automatic dismissal resulted from a token 
showing by the defense that the named plaintiffs may not have a claim. 
In the instant case, suppose hypothetically there are 1,000 
members of the class. The named class representative was allegedly 
determined four years into the litigation to have no justiciable claim, but the 
other 999 class members do have a claim. Why on earth should the case be 
dismissed? Such a result is very unjust. 
The Tenth Circuit has also acknowledged the certified class 
exception to the mootness doctrine in Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825 (10th 
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Cir. 1976). The action will not be held moot, despite the named plaintiff, 
where the suit has been "duly certified as a class action." Id. at 826. The court 
noted that, "upon certification, the class of unnamed persons acquires a legal 
status separate from the named plaintiff, and its existence satisfies the 'cases 
or controversies' requirement of Article III of the Constitution." Id., quoting 
Franks, 424 U.S. at 827. 
The Class II plaintiffs have shown that their positions are so 
concretely adverse to the State that their continued litigation of the case will 
sharpen the issues before the court. As in Franks, the Third District Court 
certified two valid classes where the class representatives had bona fide 
controversies typical of the classes they represented. R. 98-101; Franks, 424 
U.S. at 751. As required by that certification, all named plaintiffs at that time 
were determined to be members of their respective classes and to adequately 
represent the members of those classes. R. 98-101. Notably, the State did not 
oppose the motion to certify and stipulated to the certification of the classes. 
R. 97. Accordingly, each of these possibly hundreds of individuals is entitled 
to the right guaranteed under McCoy, even if their class representative no 
longer has a stake for attorney fees. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 751. 
The only evidence reviewed by the trial court in considering the 
motion for summary judgment was self-serving affidavits from ORS employees 
concerning the alleged status of the cases of Billie Henderson, Damian 
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Henderson, and Wayne Rubens, the named class representatives. R. 572-78. 
These affidavits claimed either that the named plaintiff did not incur attorney 
fees or that attorney fees were offset. Citing Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the State contended: 
[N]one of the named plaintiffs or class representatives have such 
a claim. Therefore, the claim cannot be brought or continued by 
the unnamed members of the class. As a result, the entire class 
action must be dismissed. 
R. 561 (emphasis added). The State cited no case law for the highlighted part 
of the passage above! Appellants are not aware of any precedent to support the 
proposition that an entire class action must be dismissed if the named class 
representative is proven not to have a claim. Yet, that is why the trial court 
dismissed the case. R. 704-5 (athe claims of the named plaintiffs have failed 
on the merits"). 
C. Contested Issues of Fact on Class Members. 
There is substantive evidence that Class II has many members 
with valid claims. The affidavit of Attorney Mitch Vilos attests that at least two 
of his clients had liens placed on their settlements by the State and were not 
allowed to offset attorney fees. R. 632-34. This is only the tip of a very large 
iceberg, as suggested by the example of David Sevey in McCoy. Sevey, a 
recipient, was denied permission by the State to represent its claim in 1993, 
made a recovery on his own, and then had a portion of the recovery taken by 
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the State without being allowed to offset attorney fees. Seven years passed 
until McCoy was decided. Surely, Sevey was not a universe of one; there must 
have been many more like him. 
It was counsel's personal experience during this same time frame 
that denial of consent and failure to offset were more the rule than the 
exception. R. 632-34. When discovery is finally allowed, we expect to find 
at least several hundred legitimate plaintiffs in this category. 
The outlandish reality was that in the pre-McCoy world, the State 
did not have to pay attorney fees unless it gave permission. So, in many of the 
best cases, the State would simply deny permission, await the recovery by the 
recipient, and then step in to grab its payment in full without having to pay a 
dime. The hundreds of Utahns who were so treated should be allowed to 
recover the State's share of attorney fees. This injustice requires that the 
unnamed class members have their day in court. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is a showing 
'that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Dairy Product Services, Inc. v. City 
of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 587 (Utah 2000) (citations omitted). When 
considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court 
should view the facts and all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to 
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the losing party below. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 
636 (Utah 1989). 
In the case at hand, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether 
unnamed members of the class were allowed to offset attorney fees and costs 
against the State's recovery. Plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence of a dispute 
of material fact in the form of an affidavit proving that certain unnamed 
plaintiff class members were not allowed to offset their payments to the State 
for attorney fees. This Court has held that, "It only takes one sworn statement 
to dispute averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue 
of fact, precluding summary judgment.'' Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 524 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1975). In considering the motion for summary judgment, the 
trial court's "sole inquiry is whether there is a material issue of fact to be 
decided" and any attempt by the court to weigh contradicting evidence is 
improper. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1987). 
The record shows that the class members filed an Affidavit of 
James D. Vilos on July 25, 2000, stating the affiant's personal knowledge of 
the State's refusal to allow two unnamed members, Carol Houtz and Kenny 
Nattress, to offset attorney fees from the reimbursement they paid the State. 
R. 632-46. This one sworn statement was enough to create an issue of material 
fact as to whether there are class members who have not been allowed to offset 
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for attorney fees. But there is far more evidence by way of reasonable 
inference, since seven years passed between the State's denial of Sevey in 
McCoy and the McCoy decision. There are, undoubtedly, many more unnamed 
plaintiffs out there just like Sevey. Appellants therefore met their burden of 
showing a material fact in issue and the motion for summary judgment should 
have been denied. 
As to the named plaintiffs, Appellants have been prohibited from 
conducting discovery and, therefore, have been unable to establish the veracity 
of these alleged offsets. R. 572-78. As a rule, summary judgment is not 
appropriate if discovery is incomplete because a party may obtain information 
through discovery that creates genuine issues of material fact which would 
allow the party to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Downtown 
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (1987). Since Appellants were not permitted to conduct any discovery 
from the earliest stages of this case, they were handcuffed in their attempts to 
gather enough information to refute the State's affidavits. 
D. McCoy Dispositively Resolved the Issue of Attorney Fees 
in Favor of Appellants, 
McCoy held that a Medicaid recipient whose injuries stemmed 
from a third party liability case may offset one-third of the State's recovery of 
those benefits for attorney fees and costs. See 999 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Utah 
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2000). The right is virtually unlimited. The applicant need not request 
permission, the State need not grant consent, and the applicant need provide 
omy limited cooperation. As to consent, uthe attorney fees portion of [the 
statute] in no way limits the award of attorney fees to recipients who obtained 
consent to pursue the State's claim." Id. at 576 (parenthetical added). As to 
cooperation, the recipient's duty is limited to "identifying and providing 
information to assist the State in pursuing any third party who may be liable to 
pay for medical care and services." Id. at 577, fn. 4. However, no more 
cooperation is necessary than merely identifying the potential individual 
because, "McCoy failed to keep the State minimally informed, but McCoy's 
lack of forthrightness did not prejudice the State's claim against the third 
party." Id. Justice Russon noted that: 
while the Act provides discretion to the State when selecting a 
suitable avenue for recovering medical assistance, each method 
of recovery requires the State to pay its share of attorney fees. 
Id. (emphasis added). The opinion accepts a fact that attorneys who have 
represented Medicaid recipients have long known, that: 
it would be inherently unfair not to award attorney fees to 
McCoy, who has followed the requirements of the Act in securing 
a recovery in behalf of his client. 
Id. The State may pursue reimbursement through various methods, but it must 
always pay its share of fees: 
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The State may (1) take action directly against the third party, for 
which the State pays its own expenses; (2) grant consent to 
recipients seeking to pursue the State's claim, whereby the State's 
recovery will be reduced by reasonable attorney fees and, if any, 
its proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3) refuse 
consent and proceed against the recipient after the recipient 
recovers from the third party, in which case the State9s recovery 
shall be reduced by reasonable attorney's fees. 
Id. (emphasis and double emphasis added). The State has no options here. If 
it recovers reimbursement due to the efforts of the recipient's attorney, it owes 
an attorney fee. That is imminently fair. 
The trial court erred when it refused to apply McCoy to the 
unnamed members of Class II. The court's decision is bereft of any indication 
as to why it failed to consider the outstanding rights of the unnamed members 
of Class II to claim attorney fees against the State. R. 704-5. In fact, 
quizzically, the court notes in a footnote that McCoy requires the State to pay 
attorney fees but makes no mention of unnamed class members who have not 
been allowed an offset for attorney fees. R. 704, n. 1. One can only conclude 
that the trial court failed to consider the viable claims of unnamed class 
members who were not allowed to offset. 
The impact of requiring the State to pay its share of recoveries 
will be immediate and beneficial to the recipients involved. Since most 
attorneys take their contingency fees on a percentage of the gross settlement 
proceeds, most fee monies repaid by the State as a result of this class action 
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will go back into the pockets of the needy recipients, not the attorneys who 
have already been paid. These funds will go toward providing for the victims' 
future care and help insure their well-being. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's priority constitutes an illegal lien or recovery under 
federal law because it takes a disproportionate amount - sometimes the 
entirety - of the recipient's TPL recovery. Utah statutes clearly contemplate 
an independent third party tort claim by the recipient, as long as the claim does 
not include the State's medical assistance claim. On the other hand, the State's 
claim is statutorily limited to the amount of medical assistance it has paid. At 
the moment of settlement, therefore, there are two valid claims on the 
settlement proceeds, the State's medical assistance lien and the recipient's 
claim for all other damages. The application of the priority substantially 
impairs or destroys the recipient's claim, which is inconsistent with the many 
state and federal statutes which purport to protect that claim. The only way to 
resolve this apparent conflict, while protecting the interests of both the State 
and the recipient, is to apportion the claims as many other states do. This 
apportionment is implied by the statutes and Utah case law, and is fair. 
This Court ruled unequivocally in McCoy that a recipient who 
recovers Medicaid reimbursement for the State from a third party tortfeasor is 
entitled to have the State pay a one-third attorney fee on the State's recovery. 
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There is significant evidence in the record, as well as reasonable inferences, 
that there were many class members who were denied this attorney fee 
contribution. Even if, after discovery, the named class representatives are 
determined to not have a cause of action, the unnamed, certified class 
members, as a matter of law, have a right to a hearing on their claims. It was 
error for the trial court not to apply McCoy to unnamed, certified class 
members. 
Accordingly, the summary judgment should be reversed as to all 
class members, and the matter should be remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 2001. 
LOBERT B. SYKE&,^sq. 
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